Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Air Transportation: A New Tool for Global Airlines to Redress Market Barriers by Steinberg, Andrew B. & Kotuby, Charles T., Jr.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 76 | Issue 3 Article 2
2011
Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Air
Transportation: A New Tool for Global Airlines to
Redress Market Barriers
Andrew B. Steinberg
Charles T. Kotuby Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew B. Steinberg et al., Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Air Transportation: A New Tool for Global Airlines to Redress
Market Barriers, 76 J. Air L. & Com. 457 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol76/iss3/2
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION: A NEW
TOOL FOR GLOBAL AIRLINES TO REDRESS
MARKET BARRIERS
ANDREW B. STEINBERG*
CHARLES T. KOTUBY, JR.**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 458
II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: A BASIC
PRIM ER ............................................ 460
III. APPLYING INVESTMENT TREATIES TO CROSS-
BORDER AVIATION DISPUTES ................... 467
A. THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S COVERED
"INVESTMENTS" .. ................................. 472
B. USING INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION TO REDRESS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAw:
DIRECT INCORPORATION AND FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT ......................... 476
C. USING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TO VINDICATE
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO NATIONAL AND
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT .............. 487
D. "UMBRELLA CLAUSES" IN INVESTMENT TREATIES:
THE ELEVATION OF ORDINARY CONTRACT
DISPUTES INTO TREATY DISPUTES ................ 492
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 497
* Andrew Steinberg is co-chair of Jones Day's aviation practice and a parter in
the firm's government regulation group. He formerly served as Assistant
Secretary of Transportation for Aviation and International Affairs and Chief
Counsel of the Federal Aviation Administration. He holds an A.B. degree from
Princeton University (1980) and aJ.D. degree from Harvard Law School (1984).
** Charles Kotuby is an associate at Jones Day in Washington D.C., where he
specializes in international arbitration and appellate litigation. He received a
J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh (2001) and an LL.M. from the University of
Durham (2000).
457
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
I. INTRODUCTION
ALMOST AS SOON as foreign investment began in earnest,
Z oreign investment disputes arose. In 1910, U.S. Secretary
of State Elihu Root observed how "[t]he great accumulation of
capital in the money centers of the world [was] far in excess of
the opportunities for home investment, [which] led to a great
increase of international investment extending over the entire
surface of the earth."1 But, he went on, such "peaceful interpen-
etration among the nations of the earth naturally contribute[s]
their instances of citizens justly or unjustly dissatisfied with the
treatment they receive in foreign countries" at the hands of for-
eign executives, legislatures, or judiciaries. 2 At that time, and
for many decades to follow, the only means by which such "dis-
satisfactions" could be adjudicated under international law was
in the courts of the host state or by the home state of the inves-
tor instituting "diplomatic protection" of its national and taking
action against the investment host state.3 Diplomatic protection
could take various forms, including the initiation of arbitral or
judicial proceedings before an ad hoc tribunal or the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. In practice, however, this recourse was
limited because it required the home state of an investor to be
politically willing to take direct state-to-state action.
Now, this has all changed. Bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), which have only become truly relevant in the past fifteen
years, eliminate this difficulty by conferring international law
rights directly on individual investors and providing a procedu-
ral means for them to take legal action directly against the host
state in binding arbitration.4 The substantive rules of law appli-
cable in such cases derive from the BIT entered into by the host
state of the investment and the home state of the investor.
These rules, to a large extent, incorporate and draw upon the
more general rules of international law. The purpose of this
regime is to provide universal standards in an impartial venue to
I Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT'L L.
517, 518 (1910).
2 Id. at 519.
3Id. at 522.
4 Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 403, 415 (2006).
5 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [here-




resolve international investment disputes without the direct in-
volvement of the investor's home state.
Airlines and the business of aviation are, in general and by
their very nature, designed to extend beyond their home state
and spread "over the entire surface of the earth."6 Like ships
sailing the high seas, however, they are still intrinsically tied to,
and highly regulated by, their state of registration. It is no sur-
prise, then, that the legal norms governing international air
transport derive from bilateral and multilateral agreements be-
tween sovereign states. These agreements provide the substan-
tive rules of air transit for each and every airline, which, in turn,
give rise to the treatment that those airlines can expect to re-
ceive from foreign sovereigns. Indicative of the era in which
they were designed, these agreements also give authority to each
carrier's home state to raise, arbitrate, and settle disputes con-
cerning the application of those norms before ad hoc arbitral
bodies or under the auspices of a specialized United Nations'
body, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
But airlines, like any other multinational commercial enter-
prise, are also investors. This article proposes that businesses
engaged in international aviation can and should take advan-
tage of bilateral investment treaties to resolve many of the com-
mon regulatory disputes that arise in their international
operations. Three specific types of cases are discussed. First, the
web of international laws regarding global air transport may be
directly invoked by aviation investors against recalcitrant states
under relevant BITs, seeking prospective cessation of national
measures that run afoul of international aviation law and retro-
spective damages for the harm inflicted by the inconsistent mea-
sure. This is possible not only where the relevant treaty
incorporates international law as the substantive law of decision
over an investment dispute, but also where the aviation rule at
issue forms a legitimate expectation of the aviation investor,
such that it provides the proper interpretive context to discern
the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" under the treaty.v
Second, most, if not all, BITs guarantee national and non-dis-
6 M. Christine Boyer, Aviation and the Aerial View: Le Corbusier's Spatial Transfor-
mations in the 1930s and 1940s, 33.3/4 DIACRITICS 93, 110 (2003), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v33/33.3boyer.html.
7 Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Papers on In-
ternational Investment, Paper No. 2004/3, 2004), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.
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criminatory treatment of foreign investments. Treatment in vio-
lation of that basic standard has long been a common complaint
from international airlines, and these airlines now have a means
and a forum to vindicate their rights below state-to-state negotia-
tions and above local courts. Third, and perhaps most broadly,
many modern BITs obligate investment-host states to respect
and adhere to their contractual commitments with foreign in-
vestors, whether those commitments come by way of contract or
regulatory expectations.
Because aviation is inherently international, because global
airlines cannot operate without investing in foreign states, and
because those states hold significant regulatory clout over cross-
border aviation operations, investment treaties provide a power-
ful and necessary tool for aviation businesses to vindicate their
legitimate expectations and force state compliance with the web
of supranational regulations provided by international aviation
law.
II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: A
BASIC PRIMER
Since the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) was first established in 1966,8 "invest-
ment treaty arbitration has moved from a matter of peripheral
academic interest to a matter of vital international concern."9
This is partly because most contemporary investment treaties in-
clude compulsory clauses for the settlement of disputes between
foreign investors and the host state, allowing such investors to
bring claims against the host state before international arbitral
tribunals. These arbitration clauses operate as consent by the
host state signatory to arbitrate any and all disputes, at the inves-
tor's initiative, over the treaty's meaning and application:
All that is necessary to form an agreement to arbitrate is for one
party to be a BIT signatory and the other to consent to arbitra-
tion of an investment dispute in accordance with the Treaty's
terms. In effect, [the contracting state's] accession to the Treaty
constitutes a standing offer to arbitrate disputes covered by the
Treaty; a foreign investor's written demand for arbitration com-
8 About ICSID, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?RequestType=casesrh&actionval=Show
Home&PageName=AboutICSlD_Home (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
9 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT'L LJ. 435, 435 (2009).
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pletes the "agreement in writing" to submit the dispute to
arbitration.1"
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties were the
forerunners to the modern-day BITs."1 While purporting to
guarantee the same sort of fair treatment and due process rights
for foreign investors, FCN treaties pre-dated the establishment
of the ICSID but only provided for the resolution of state-to-
state disputes and thereby gave exclusive standing to the inves-
tor's sovereign to raise claims on behalf of citizen investors
against other states.1 2 BITs, therefore, wholly transformed the
landscape of investment protection. Private companies no
longer depend on the discretion of their home states-which
will be affected by a host of considerations having little to do
with investors' particular problems-to invoke diplomatic pro-
tection in raising a claim against another state.1 3 Investors can
bring an international claim against their host sovereign
themselves. 4
There are at present some 2,000 bilateral and regional invest-
ment treaties that provide for compulsory arbitration of invest-
ment disputes between investors and their host state. 15 The first
pacts to incorporate state consents to investment arbitration
were a handful of BITs signed in the late 1960s; they became
more common in the 1970s and 1980s. 16 But "[i]t was only dur-
ing the 1990s that investment arbitration clearly emerged as an
international mechanism of adjudicative review. ''1 7 "In that dec-
10 Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 393 (2011).
11 KATE MILES, A POLITICAL JUNCTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
BREAKING FROM THE PAST OR REPRODUCING ECONOMIC IMPERILISM? 3 (2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.
12 Id.
13 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes-An Intro-
duction, in NEw HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BE-
YOND 125, 125-31 (AlbertJan van den Berg ed., 2005);JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN
LowE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEDURES 1-15 (1999); M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT DISPUTES 61-84 (2000); see also Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic Protection of
Foreign Investors: A Tale of Judicial Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 341 (Christina
Binder et al. eds., 2009).
14 Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 416 (2006).
15 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (2006).
16 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S 8-10 & fig. 1.1 (1998).
17 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15.
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ade, roughly 1,500 BITs were concluded, and the inclusion of
states' consents to investment arbitration . became the
norm. '"18 This wave of new treaties was not confined to the con-
ventional relationship (typified by disputes over expropriation
of assets) between capital-exporting and capital-importing states;
developing states, too, began to sign investment treaties among
themselves. 19
Cases and controversies soon followed the treaties. "From
1995 to 2004 ICSID registered four times as many claims as in
the previous 30 years," and that trend appears to be holding.2"
"ByJuly 2005 there were 91 claims pending, more than all of the
claims registered at ICSID during its entire history until 2001."21
"As the late Professor Thomas Walde once [said], '... . the ability
to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host state ... is the
principal advantage of a modern investment treaty .... "22 In
ten short years, the "right and procedural remedy, .... in practi-
cal and effective terms, [have become] one."23 And, these rights
and remedies are not going away anytime soon; most BITs have
very long "tails," meaning that even if a state were to withdraw its
assent to the treaty, it would still be effective for several years
after the official notification of withdrawal. 24
18 Id.; see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999 1, 4 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (reporting that the number of BITs quintupled dur-
ingthe 1990s, from 385 in 1989 to 1,857 by 1999, involving 102 countries in 1989
and 173 countries in 1999).
19 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW 33, 34 (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/iteiitl3_en.pdf. Before the 1990s, nearly all investment treaties were
concluded between capital-exporting and capital-importing states, usually based
on model BITs adopted by the major capital-exporting countries. Id.
20 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15, at 124.
21 Id. This is only a snapshot of the explosion of investment arbitration be-
cause ICSID is only one forum for these disputes. Other forums, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce's International Court of Arbitration or ad
hoc tribunals established under the UNCITRAL Rules, are also available for in-
vestor-state disputes, and these fora normally keep cases confidential unless both
disputing parties agree otherwise.
22 Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67, 71 (2010).
23 Thomas Walde, The "Umbrella" (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt Servanda)
Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 1
TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. 4, 13 (2004).
24 See, e.g., Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Ger., art. 15(4), Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chinagermany.pdf [hereinafter China-Ger.
BIT] (providing that "[w]ith respect to investments made prior to the date of
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The elevation of private-sovereign disputes to the interna-
tional plane and the guarantee of a neutral forum for investors
who were once limited to local courts and remedies has for all
intents and purposes created the world's first "comprehensive
form of global administrative law."'25 States have waived their
sovereign immunity, agreed to give "arbitrators... comprehen-
sive jurisdiction over what are essentially regulatory disputes," as-
sented to rules affecting foreign investors, and given authority to
review and control their exercise of power to a panel of neu-
trals. 26 By signing these treaties, these states have not only given
their own investors a powerful tool against expropriation, na-
tionalization, and other forms of arbitrary or discriminatory reg-
ulation by foreign sovereigns, but they have concordantly
transferred their own adjudicative authority from national
courts to arbitral tribunals for these certain classes of disputes.27
In situations where contracts between an enterprise and a state
expressly limit recourse to local dispute settlement options, eli-
gible claimants can even bypass national courts and bring invest-
ment claims directly to arbitral tribunals.28 Some commentators
have thus noted that investment treaty arbitration is "more
tightly analogous to domestic judicial review than other forms of
international adjudication. '"29
The legal norms for reviewing sovereign action appear in
each BIT. Some are near-universal. Foreign investors are typi-
cally entitled to "'fair and equitable treatment,"' which gener-
ally means that the host state assumes an obligation to protect
termination of this Agreement, the [Treaty] shall continue to be effective for a
further period of twenty years from such date of termination"); Agreement Con-
cerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-U.K.,
art. 12, May 15, 1986, [hereinafter China-U.K. BIT], available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-china.pdf (providing for continua-
tion of the treaty for fifteen years after the date of withdrawal).
25 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15.
26 See Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration
of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 371, 372 (2007) (em-
phasis added).
27 See Vadi, supra note 22.
28 Several recent ICSID cases upheld jurisdiction to hear treaty claims, notwith-
standing the fact that the foreign investor was party to a contract specifying that
contract claims would be the exclusive province of a given domestic court. See
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Objections to Jurisdiction, 131 (July 17, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, 808 (2003); Com-
pafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
97/3, Decision on Annulment, 14-15 (Nov. 21, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 641
(2001).
29 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15.
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the investors' "legitimate and reasonable expectations" to treat-
ment above the minimum standard of international law."° For-
eign investments are also typically entitled to "full protection
and security," which is "wider than 'physical' protection and se-
curity"'" and requires an investment host state to take "all mea-
sures of precaution to protect the [foreign] investments ... on
its territory." 2 BITs also usually forbid states from expropriat-
ing foreign investments without due compensation and from en-
acting discriminatory and arbitrary legislation.13 Some BITs
have even more general provisions. So-called "umbrella clauses"
allow foreign investors to bring ordinary contract claims before
an international arbitral tribunal in the first instance rather
than the courts of the host state 4.3  Other BITs broadly incorpo-
rate the substantive rules of international law to assess the legal-
ity (under the treaty) of state action taken against a foreign
investor.35
While the advent of investment treaty arbitration to resolve
regulatory disputes is novel, the system for dispute resolution
itself is familiar and well worn. Investment treaty arbitration
shares most of the key attributes of typical international com-
mercial arbitration. Central to both is the right to choose an
arbitrator, often considered the very essence of arbitration. 36 Al-
though the treaties will specify which rules apply (ICSID or
UNICTRAL), the parties to an investment dispute can deter-
30 Saluka Invs. B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 302, UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration (Mar. 17, 2006); see also id. 285-309 (discussing the FET
standard as protecting an investor's legitimate ex pectations).
31 Siemens A.G. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
303 (Feb. 6, 2007).
32 Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, 6.05
(Feb. 21, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (2002).
33 Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, International Investment Treaty Protection of
Not-for-Profit Organizations, 10 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 1, 56, 60-63 (2007),
available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol1lOissl/ijnl-vollOissl.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Treaty with Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rom., art. II(2)(c), May 28, 1992, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 102-36 (1994), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/43584.pdf ("[e]ach Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered
into with regard to investments.").
35 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 162,
164, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Sept. 13, 2001), available at http://italaw.com/doc-
uments/CME-2001ParialAward.pdf.
36 Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE
OF ARBITRATORS 119, 123 (1991).
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mine the composition of the arbitral tribunal. 7 Confidentiality
is another feature of the arbitral process.3 8 Hearings are often
held in camera39 and the final award may not be published, de-
pending on the parties' will.40 Even the names of the parties
and the details of the dispute are not always disclosed.41 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, awards rendered against host
states are not only binding under the relevant BIT but are also
readily enforceable against host-state property worldwide, a re-
sult of the widespread adoption of the New York and Washing-
ton (ICSID) Conventions.42 The decisions have only limited
avenues for revision and cannot be amended by the domestic
37 See G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) [herein-
after UNCITRAL Rules]; ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 37.
38 See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 37, art. 25(4).
39 Id.
40 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], Rules
of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, at Rule 48(4), ICSID/15 (April 2006)
[hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules]; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 37, art.
32(5).
41 See, e.g., Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arb. Rules, art.
46 (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/skilje domsregler-
4.aspx. In recent years, however, some efforts to make investment arbitration
more transparent have been undertaken in different fora. In response to calls
from civil society groups, the three parties to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)-the United States, Canada, and Mexico-have pledged to
disclose all NAFTA arbitrations and open future arbitration hearings to the pub-
lic. Joint Statement, Pierre S. Pettigren, Minister for Int'l Trade (Ca.), Fernando
Canales, Sec. of Econ. (Mex.), Robert B. Zoellick, Trade Rep. (U.S.), Celebrating
NAFTA at Ten (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/State-
ment.aspx?lang=eng. Increasingly, investment arbitration tribunals have allowed
public interest groups to present amicus curiae briefs or have access to the arbi-
tral process. These important moves, however, involve the conduct of the pro-
ceedings of a limited number of investment disputes. Indeed, the vast majority of
existing treaties do not mandate such transparency, which means that most of the
proceedings are resolved behind closed doors.
42 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investments, U.S.-Arg., art. VII(5)-(6), Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (entered
into force Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Arg. BIT], available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina-us.pdf (specifying that
arbitral awards rendered by virtue of the treaty shall be "final and binding on the
parties to the dispute"); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (providing that "[e]ach contracting state
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if
it were a final judgment of a court in that state"); Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. I, opened for signature June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter N.Y. Convention].
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legal system.43 Arbitration under the ICSID rules is wholly ex-
empted from the supervision of local courts, with awards subject
only to an internal annulment process."
The system has drawn its fair share of criticism precisely be-
cause it works to level the playing field between investors and
sovereigns. After being repeatedly sued and held liable under
BIT obligations, some developing countries have sent formal no-
tices to ICSID declaring their withdrawal from the ICSID Con-
vention and their intention to pursue revisions to their BITs in
order to direct investors' claims solely to domestic fora.45 Polit-
ics certainly explain some of this mistrust of the system but so
does leverage and cost; the once "David-Goliath" relationship
between private investors facing sovereign states and their
home-town advantage has been replaced, at least procedurally,
by a neutral forum. And in some circumstances, private claim-
ants and large multinational companies may have more re-
sources available than a small state acting as a respondent.
Developed states have levied criticism, too. The European
Commission raised concerns over the opportunities for forum
shopping that investment arbitration provides and expressed its
desire to abolish BITs signed by European Union (EU) member
states to eliminate the potential legal "uncertainty" that could
result from matters of EU law being decided by a panel of inter-
national arbitrators, rather than the European Court of Justice
(CJEU).46 The European Commission considered requiring
43 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 15, at 134-35.
44 Id. The ICSID annulment process provides for a very limited review. ICSID
annulment committees only have the ability to annul awards and send them back
to the tribunal or to a new tribunal for a new decision but cannot replace the
decision with their own. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 40, at Rules 50-55.
The grounds for annulment are very narrow and concern due process issues such
as the following: the tribunal was not properly constituted, it manifestly exceeded
its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member, there was a fundamen-
tal and serious departure from a procedural rule, or the award did not state the
reasons on which it was based.
45 See, e.g., Press Release, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), availa-
ble at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH;
Press Release, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice




46 Damon Vis-Dumbar, EU Member States Re'ect the Call to Terminate Intra-EU Bi-




clauses in future BITs "to prevent the watering down of social
and environmental laws" because, in its view, the current mecha-
nisms at investors' disposal "pose a threat to European democ-
racy."47 Similarly, Australia has been uneasy with the idea of
compulsory and binding investment-related arbitrations, and,
consequently, the investment chapter of the U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement leaves out provisions on investor-state dispute
resolution .48
III. APPLYING INVESTMENT TREATIES TO CROSS-
BORDER AVIATION DISPUTES
Effective ways of resolving disputes with foreign sovereigns in
international air transportation have long eluded the private
sector. To date, airlines have largely been at the mercy of their
own governments, as explained below. That may change as
these firms come to realize that the possibility of investment ar-
bitration exists in parallel with the less than satisfactory alterna-
tive measures.
"Transportation has [always] been perceived as an industry
imbued with a particular public interest," and air transportation
may represent the apex of this interest.49 "The foundations of
aviation law and regulation were created by common law, stat-
utes, and governmental institutions that regulated the modes of
transportation that predated aviation . . . ." But from its incep-
tion, the airline industry has been special. Because aviation has
erased geopolitical borders like no other form of transportation
in history, it has been rightly perceived as a unique catalyst for
global economic growth and an essential means for facilitating
cross-border travel, communications, and national defense. For
the same reasons, however, its true potential can only be real-
ized through close cooperation between states and the industry
the-call-to-terminate-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties.aspx. The European
Commission expressed it fears that such parallel regimes may create legal uncer-
tainty and forum shopping in favor of arbitration. Id. The EU member states,
however, have resisted this push because they believe that their investors are bet-
ter protected under the BITs than under EU law alone. Id.
47 Daan Bauwens, Europe: Investment Treaties Undemocratic, GLOBAL ISSUES (May
19, 2011), http://www.globalissues.org/news/2011/05/19/9716.
48 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., ch. 11, May 14,
2004, 118 Stat. (entered into forceJan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.dfat.gov.
au/fta/ausfta/final-text/indexhtml.
49 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANsp. L. J. 235,
241 (2003).
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they each seek to regulate. Thus, aviation is-and has always
been-highly regulated everywhere in the world.
Toward the end of World War II, the Allied Powers began
working toward creating "conditions of stability and well-being
[that] are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations. '50 At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the archi-
tects of this new international legal order laid the groundwork
for the creation of specialized UN institutions to address inter-
national economic objectives (specifically, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank)."1 Aviation was seen as a
key component to economic growth and stability, so in Novem-
ber of that year, delegates from fifty-two states met in Chicago to
plan the "future development of international civil aviation" to
"help . . . create and preserve friendship and understanding
among the nations and peoples of the world. '5 2 The resulting
Chicago Convention established "certain principles and ar-
rangements in order that international civil aviation may be de-
veloped in a safe and orderly manner and that international air
transport services may be established on the basis of equality of
opportunity and operated soundly and economically. ' 53 By vir-
tue of signing the Chicago Convention, "[e]ach contracting
State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practica-
ble degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures,
and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and
auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will fa-
cilitate and improve air navigation. 54
The Chicago Convention placed international interests above
those that are purely regional. It recognized that international
civil aviation had to develop in the context of pre-existing cus-
tomary international law.55 At the heart of the Chicago Conven-
tion is respect for the principle of customary international law
that each "State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
50 UN Charter art. 55.
51 Robert L. McGeorge, An Introduction and Commentary: Revisiting the Role of
Liberal Trade Policy in Promoting Idealistic Objectives of the International Legal Order, 14
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 305, 309-10 (1994).
52 Convention on International Civil Aviation, pmbl., opened for signature Dec.
7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
53 Id.
54 Id. art. 37.
55 Andrew Macintosh, Overcoming the Barriers to International Aviation Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Abatement, 6 (Australian Nat'l Univ., Ctr. for Climate Law & Policy
Working Paper Series 2008/2, 2008).
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airspace above its territory."56 This principle is reflected in
other substantive provisions throughout the Chicago Conven-
tion, too. For instance, Article 11 limits the application of any
contracting state's laws to aircraft only upon "admission to or
departure from its territory... or to the operation and naviga-
tion of such aircraft while within its territory. ' 57 Article 12 sup-
plements this rule by providing that "[o]ver the high seas, the
rules in force shall be those established under this Convention,"
and not any particular national law of a contracting state. 58 To
fill the void of limiting national law, the Chicago Convention
also created the ICAO as a specialized U.N. institution to "adopt
. . . international standards and recommended practices and
procedures . . . and such other matters concerned with the
safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation. 59
The architects of the Chicago Convention also recognized
that they had to give contracting states an opportunity to deter-
mine some aspects of international airline operations through
bilateral negotiations. 6° Thus, while the Chicago Convention
provides the foundation for a comprehensive international air
transportation system, several thousand separate bilateral air ser-
vices agreements build on this foundation, as do multilateral air
services agreements for "selected geographic regions, including
the EU and parts of the Caribbean, South America, West Africa,
and South-East Asia."61 Like the Chicago Convention before it,
these bilateral agreements often vest ICAO with the authority to
settle disagreements between two or more contracting states
over the application of its rules.62
The key qualification here is "between two or more con-
tracting States."' 63 The possibility for arbitration and a remedy is
entirely state-centric; private claimants have no right to press a
claim without the proxy of their home sovereign and no right to
receive financial relief if a claim made by their state were to suc-
ceed.64 In all of these legal instruments, however, there is little
56 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 1.
57 Id. art. 11.
58 Id. art. 12.
59 Id. art. 37.
60 Macintosh, supra note 55.
61 See id.
62 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Flights of Fancy and Flights of Fury: Arbitration and Ad-
judication of Commercial and Political Disputes in International Aviation, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 231, 234 (2004).
63 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 84.
64 Dempsey, supra note 62.
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doubt that the rights established were intended to inure directly
to private airlines. Indeed, the preamble to the Chicago Con-
vention envisages benefits to private carriers,6" and many of its
provisions expressly guarantee rights for private airlines.66 The
Chicago Convention established rights for aircraft to be free
from certain taxes, fees, dues, and other charges imposed by
contracting states; for example, national laws imposing financial
levies for the mere right to fly over or land in a state's territory
are prohibited, as are taxes on fuel onboard a landing aircraft.67
Bilateral agreements replicate many of these freedoms68 and
often include additional guarantees to commercial carriers, like
the freedom "to determine the frequency and capacity of the
international air transportation it offers based on commercial
considerations in the marketplace," and not the regulatory fiat
of the destination state.69
Multilateral efforts to wrest this exclusive competence from
these state-to-state mechanisms have largely failed. In 1989, the
United States proposed a draft agreement on trade in services
for other countries to consider that included air transportation
and applied the GATT principles of national treatment, non-dis-
crimination, and dispute resolution. Ultimately, however,
these principles enshrined in the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) were only applied to a limited range of avia-
tion services, such as aircraft repair and maintenance services,
65 See Chicago Convention, supra note 52 (aiming to ensure that "international
air transport services . . . be established on the basis of equality of opportunity
and operated soundly and economically").
66 See, e.g., id. art. 79.
67 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 24. U.S. courts have concluded on
at least two occasions that these same provisions of the Chicago Convention are
"self-executing," and, thus, can be invoked by private claimants in a national
court. See British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that Articles 15 and 24, inter alia, of the Chicago Convention
can be invoked by private claimants because they "set forth rights or obligations
of the contracting states and their flag carriers that require no legislation or ad-
ministrative regulations to implement them"); Aerovias Interamericanas de Pan-
ama, S. A. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Dade County, 197 F. Supp. 230, 248 (S.D.
Fla. 1961).
68 See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-E.U., art. 11, Apr. 18, 2007, 2007 0J.
(L 134) 50 [hereinafter U.S.-E.U. Open Skies Agreement].
69 Id. art. 3(4) (providing further that "neither Party shall unilaterally limit the
volume of traffic, frequency, or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types
operated by the airlines of the other Party").
70 See Whether International Airline Services Should Be Included in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H.
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong. 7-8 (1989).
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sales and marketing of air transport services, and computer res-
ervation services. 71 The most contentious aspects of civil avia-
tion relations, including routes and fares, were carved out of
that multilateral agreement.72
This is where investment treaties come into play. While these
instruments do not specifically address the legal regulation of
cross-border air operations, when such operations are directly
related to a carrier's "investment" in its destination state, BITs
require that those operations be treated in a specific manner.73
Only a handful of agreements (nearly all signed by the United
States) have carved out aviation disputes from their scope and
even then, not completely.74 The vast majority of other BITs,
however, contain broad substantive protections and compulsory
arbitration clauses that do not exclude aviation, and hence offer
a method of resolving disputes that may prove to be quite effec-
tive for airline firms facing market barriers and other "doing
business" issues in foreign markets. 75 Airlines and peripheral
71 Id.
72 See the following article for a good overview discussion: Craig Canetti, Fifty
Years After the Chicago Conference: A Proposal for Dispute Settlement Under the Auspices of
the International Civil Aviation Organization, 26 LAw & POL'v INT'L Bus. 497 (1995).
73 See infra Part III.A.
74 In the U.S.-Argentina BIT, for instance, the United States expressly "re-
serve[d] the right to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment
in the . . . air transportation" sector. U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, Protocol.
These carve-outs, however, rarely insulate the entire field of aviation from all in-
vestment protections. The U.S.-Argentina BIT merely excepts the air transport
sector from guarantees of "national treatment," which simply means that the
United States reserves the right to discriminate against foreign airlines (i.e., to
treat them differently from comparable U.S. airlines). Id. Foreign airlines, how-
ever, are not deprived of the substantive right to be treated "fair[ly] and
equitab[ly]," are guaranteed "full protection and security" treatment in-line with
"that required by international law," and are assured that the United States "ob-
serve[s] any obligation it may have entered into with regard to [foreign] invest-
ments." Id. art. 11.2(a), (c). All but one of the 50 U.S. BITs follow this general
model and only carve-out aviation investments from national and/or most-fa-
vored-nation treatment guarantees. See, e.g., Albania Bilateral Investment Treaty,
U.S.-Alb., Annex, Jan. 11, 1995, S. TRETv Doc. No. 104-19 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1991), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
43474.pdf (reserving the right to "adopt or maintain exceptions to the obligation
to accord national and most favored nation treatment to covered investments in
the . . . air and maritime transport [sectors]"). Only the U.S.-Bangladesh BIT
excepts investments in the air transportation sector investments from national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full pro-
tection and security, and the umbrella clause to guarantee contract observance.
Bangladesh Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Bangl., March 12, 1986, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43480.pdf.
75 See infra Part III.B.
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aviation businesses have already begun to institute BIT arbitra-
tions to seek compensation for expropriated assets in a foreign
state,76 to adjudicate breaches of contract with foreign govern-
ments, 77 and to seek damages for the imposition of unreasona-
ble or discriminatory measures 7T-all of which are grounded in
the substantive guarantees of most BITs. Some BITs provide air-
lines with even broader protections and may enable them to
challenge foreign regulatory measures that are merely inconsis-
tent with international aviation law as it appears in other avia-
tion treaties.79 In that scenario, the airline investor may not be
restricted to seeking prospective withdrawal of the measure by
petitioning his home state to initiate arbitration before ICAO; it
may seek withdrawal and/or payment of damages by filing its
own arbitral proceeding against the offending state under the
relevant BIT.
These treaties provide a powerful tool for multinational busi-
nesses engaged in air transport and aviation services to oppose
national regulations and seek compensation for the costs that
stem from the exercise of the state's regulatory authority. The
following sections will briefly discuss how airlines might have ju-
risdiction to raise an investment treaty claim and some of the
most common claims that might arise.
A. THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S COVERED "INVESTMENTS"
A threshold question to the jurisdiction of an investment
treaty tribunal is whether the claimants have covered "invest-
ments" in the territory of the respondent state. Most BITs de-
76 See, e.g., Fraport AG Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/25, Annulment Proceeding, (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http:/
/italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf (involving the expro-
priation of contracts rights in an international air terminal); Teinver S.A., Trans-
portes de Cercanfas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1,
(pending) (claim under the Spain-Argentina BIT alleging expropriation of na-
tional airline by Argentinean government).
77 See, e.g., Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration (Oct. 9, 2009) (claim alleging breach of contract by Slovak Republic con-
cerning finding the debts of a national airline purchased and operated by a
foreign investor).
78 See, e.g., EDF Services Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award,
57, 125-26, 161 (Oct. 8, 2009) (case brought by a UK investor operating the
duty-free shops and services in Romanian airports and flights on Romanian air-
lines for, inter alia, the Romanian Government's enactment of a new law, which
tightly regulated the operation of duty-free shops and services and, in effect, re-




fine an "investment" very broadly. For example, the U.S.-
Argentina BIT expressly covers "every kind of investment in the
territory" of either State,
such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts, and
includes without limitation:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as
mortgages, liens and pledges; (ii) a company or shares of stock
or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof,
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having eco-
nomic value and directly related to an investment; (iv) intellec-
tual property. .. ; and (v) any right conferred by law or contract,
and any licenses and permits pursuant to law.8"
Arbitral tribunals followed suit and simply look to whether the
asset or enterprise in question falls within the treaty's definition
of an "investment" to satisfy their jurisdiction.8" The jurisdic-
tional decision in Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela is illustra-
tive.8 2 In that case, Venezuela issued promissory notes that were
subsequently acquired by Fedax, a Dutch investor.8 When Ven-
ezuela refused to pay on the notes, Fedax initiated arbitration.84
Venezuela argued that the mere purchase of the notes did not
constitute an "investment" in Venezuela and did not fall within
the ambit of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT.85 The tribunal,
however, found that the treaty's inclusion of the phrase "'every
kind of asset"' demonstrated "that the Contracting Parties...
intended a very broad meaning for the term 'investment. '86
This broad meaning had indeed become the standard usage: "A
broad definition of investment ... is not at all an exceptional
situation.... [It] has also become the standard policy of major
economic groupings."8 7
80 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, art. I(1) (a).
81 M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
6, Award, 159-61 (July 31, 2007); Parkerings-Compagniet v. Republic of Lith.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/08, Award, 249-54 (Sept. 11, 2007); Socidt6 G6n~r-
ale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 65-66 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
82 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction, (July 1, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998).
83 Id. 1 1, 16.
84 Id. 1 1.
85 Id. 19; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Neth.-Venez., Oct. 22, 1991, No. 31069, available at http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands venezuela.pdf.
86 Fedax N.V., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 7 31-32.
87 Id. 7 34. There is, however, a contrary trend emerging within ICSID. Those
tribunals appear to be "cutting back on their jurisdiction in an ... effort to corn-
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The fact that an aviation investment is primarily "operated
abroad," and not solely "in the territory" of the host state should
not remove an airline's investment from BIT protection. 8 In
Socitt Gjnrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines
(SGS), for example, the tribunal concluded that an investor's
claim to cash due under a service contract to perform "import
services and associated customs revenue gathering" both "within
and outside the Philippines" was an "asset" "having economic
value" in the territory of the Philippines, so as to be entitled to
BIT protection. 89 The fact that much of the service was "per-
formed abroad" did not defeat the jurisdiction of the tribunal.9"
Those services "were not carried out for their own sake" but to
municate modesty to their state-constituents and avoid applying what some view
as the investment regime's increasingly overbroad substantive rules." Julian Davis
Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Traveax and the Domain of Interna-
tional Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 272 (2010). They are doing so by
employing a checklist of criteria that every asset or enterprise must possess before
it will be deemed a covered "investment," irrespective of the language of the par-
ticular BIT at issue, including the (i) "duration" of the enterprise, (ii) "a certain
regularity of profit and return," (iii) an "assumption of risk," (iv) a "substantial"
commitment by the investor, and (v) some "significance for the host State's devel-
opment." See Helnan Int'l Hotels, A.S. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB 05/19, Decision onJurisdiction, 77 (Oct. 16, 2006);Joy Mining Mach. Ltd.
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/ 11, Award (Aug. 6, 2004), 44
I.L.M. 73 (2005); Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Deci-
sion on Annulment, (Nov. 1, 2006); Saipem, S.P.A. v. People's Republic of
Bang]., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommenda-
tion on Provisional Measures, 99 (Mar. 21, 2007), 22 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 100
(2007); see also Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
10, Award, 106 (May 17, 2007) ("[I]f any of [the factors] are absent, the tribu-
nal will hesitate (and probably decline) to make a finding of "investment."). But
see Salini Costruttori, S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) (holding that
the factors were "interdependent" and "should be assessed globally");Jan de Nul,
N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Juris-
diction, 91 (June 16, 2006) (adopting Salini factors as collectively "indicative" of
the existence of an investment). This trend has been roundly criticized, and the
practical effect has been investors shying away from ICSID, and filing their arbi-
tral claims under UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce, or the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce when they have the option. See Mortensen,
supra, at 277, 279.
88 Fedax N.V., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 34.
89 Socit6 Gn6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/06, Decision on Jurisdiction, 99-103 (Jan. 29, 2004) 8 ICSID
Rep. 518 (2005); see also Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic
of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/ 01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 133-43 (Aug.
6, 2003).
90 Socift6 G6n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/06, 101, 107, 111.
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facilitate the entry of goods and the collection of revenue in the
Philippines, for which the claimant maintained "a substantial of-
fice, employing a significant number of people" in the territory
of the Philippines and made an "injection of funds into th[at]
territory . .. for the carrying out of [its] engagements under
[its] Agreement."9'
In many ways, SGS presents a situation loosely analogous to
that of a foreign airline claimant. To commence service into a
country, an airline typically must acquire a complex web of
"right[s] conferred by law or contract" in the host state.9 2 The
mere "licenses [or] permits"9 to land in a state are often contin-
gent on the foreign airline paying a bevy of local usage charges,
such as charges for using the runway, air traffic control charges
for en route and terminal area services, and charges for meteor-
ological and aeronautical information.94 There may also be
charges for use of the terminal building and the gates, which
can be considerable.95 "Above the wing" services that must be
contractually secured include passenger bridge access, check-in
counter space, security services, customer services, and passen-
ger holding areas. "Below the wing" services such as fueling,
maintenance and repair, catering, baggage handling, and cargo
related services must also be acquired in the host state. In some
states, the airport operator itself will be the foreign carrier's con-
tracting partner to provide these services; in others, the domi-
nant air carrier may also be the service provider.
Most of those airlines will also maintain "a substantial office,
employing a significant number of people" in the territory of
the host state.96 Beyond the obvious and necessary presence of
employees directly related to maintaining a fleet of airplanes,
booking, and embarking and disembarking passengers and
cargo, airlines usually also establish relationships with distribu-
tors of travel services and other professionals to procure adver-
tising and register their trade or service marks to invoke the
91 Id.
92 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, art. I(1) (a).
93 Id.
94 See Socidt6 Gfndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/06.
95 See, e.g., Press Release, Deloitte, UK Airlines Start to Value Landing Slots as
Assets on Balance Sheets, available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/enGB/uk/
news/news-releases/969833d0303fb11oVgnVCM 100000ba42fOOaRCRD.htm
(stating that slots at London Heathrow may cost up to £30 million).
96 Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/06, 101, 111.
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protections of the jurisdiction's intellectual property laws. The
airline may also enter long-term agreements with hotels to
house their flight crews during layovers and to accommodate
passengers in the event of prolonged delays. In many cities, an
airline may have to contract with surface transportation provid-
ers to move crews between the airport and hotels." The net
result of these user charges and fees and contractual relation-
ships plainly amounts to an "injection of funds" into that state by
the foreign airline.
From all of these legal and contractual arrangements, airlines
naturally have a legitimate "claim to . ..performance having
economic value" by their host state and their contracting part-
ners.98 And, ultimately, by virtue of these arrangements and
capital outlays, airlines can expect a legitimate "claim to money"
by operating a profitable venture in the host state.99 After all,
that is the hallmark of an investment. "An expenditure to acquire
property or other assets in order to produce revenue."' 0 So when a
host state impairs a stream of revenue emanating from the ex-
penditures made by a foreign aviation investor within its bor-
ders, it has harmed a foreign "investment" and consented to
arbitrate claims that the investor might bring against it.
B. USING INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION TO REDRESS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAw: DIRECT
INCORPORATION AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
The substantive rules guaranteed to investors, and applicable
to their investment claims, are likewise grounded in the text of
the relevant treaty. Most BITs contain a clause requiring treat-
ment "in accordance with . . . international law," ''" or "in no
97 Some BITs textually incorporate such activities under its rubric of protec-
tions by guaranteeing national and/or "fair and equitable treatment" not only to
investments per se, but also "associated activities," which is defined to
include the organization, control, operation, maintenance and dis-
position of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or
other facilities for the conduct of business; the making, perform-
ance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, use, protection
and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual and
industrial property rights; and the borrowing of funds, the
purchase, issuance, and sale of equity shares and other securities,
and the purchase of foreign exchange for imports.
U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, arts. I(1)(e), 11(1).
98 Id. art. I(1)(a).
99 Id.
100 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 825 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
101 E.g., China-Ger. BIT, supra note 24, art. 8(5).
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case . . . less [favorable] than that required by international
law. '1 0 2 Some BITs are even more explicit in adopting interna-
tional law as the rule of decision, and provide that:
If the legislation of either Contracting Parties or obligations
under international law existing at present or established hereaf-
ter between the Contracting Parties in addition to this Agree-
ment contain a regulation, whether general or specific, entitling
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party to a treat-
ment more favourable than is provided for by this Agreement,
such regulation shall to the extent that it is more favourable pre-
vail over this Agreement. °3
These provisions beg the obvious question: what constitutes "in-
ternational law"? The most accepted answer comes from the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which empowers
that body to decide cases "in accordance with international law,"
which is defined by reference to, inter alia, international custom
and international conventions." 4 Construed in this light, these
BIT provisions appear to call for the application of other bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties, including those adopted after the
BIT entered into force. This means that investment arbitration
102 U.S-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, art. 11(2).
103 China-Ger. BIT, supra note 24, art. 10; see also Treaty Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Thai., art. 7(1),
June 24, 2002, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
germany thailand.pdf; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Alb., art. 2(4), Jan. 11, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. No.
104-19; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-U.K.,
art. 12, Mar. 14, 1994, available at http://www.untad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/uk india.pdf; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Neth., art. 3(5), June 17, 1985, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-netherlands.pdf; Agreement
on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Czech.-Neth., art.
3(5), Aug. 1, 1975, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/czechnetherlands.pdf; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, Fr.-Mex., art. 10(1), Nov. 12, 1998, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico-france.pdf. The applica-
bility of these provisions extends even beyond the treaties that expressly include
them. For instance, the China-U.K. BIT does not include an international law
clause, but it does include a most favored nations clause, which requires China to
give U.K. investors no less favorable treatment than other investors. See China-
U.K. BIT, supra note 24, art. 3(2). By the combination of this provision and Arti-
cle 10 of the China-Germany BIT, then, China is obligated to treat UK investors
in line with the "obligations under international law existing at present or estab-
lished hereafter." Id. art. 10. Most-favored-nation clauses are common in mod-
ern BITs.
104 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1946, 59
Stat. 1055, 8 U.N.T.S. 993.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
can serve as a means to enforce airline rights derived under the
key international aviation conventions, including the Chicago
Convention and various bilateral air services agreements.
Let's take a hypothetical example: Suppose a government in
the developing world imposed steep fees on foreign airlines
landing at its airports, without relation to any identifiable costs
in receiving those aircraft. Also, assume that state is a signatory
to the Chicago Convention, and its airports act as an important
hub for foreign carriers throughout its region. Those carriers
would have a legitimate gripe under the Chicago Convention.
Article 15 of the Convention permits charges to be imposed on
airlines for the use of airport facilities and air navigation facili-
ties, but expressly states that "[n]o fees, dues or other charges
shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the
right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any
aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property
thereon."10 5 Properly construed, it permits charges to recoup
the airport or navigational costs of that state but does not permit
charges for overflight, take-off, or landing per se.
So what can those carriers do? They could take their claim to
a local court, pleading a violation of international law and
treaty. But asking a state's courts to assess its own instrumentali-
ties' observance of international law can be a fool's errand, espe-
cially in certain parts of the developing world (and even, some
would argue, in the developed world). 106 They could implore
their own government to engage a dialogue with the recalcitrant
state, and if such efforts were not fruitful, hope that their gov-
ernment would then institute an arbitral action at ICAO (or an
ad hoc arbitral body pursuant to a bilateral aviation agreement).
105 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 15.
106 As famously noted by one renowned arbitrator and commentator, it is an
error to think that "injustice is abnormal," and that the "rule of law is the norm."
Jan Paulsson, Enclaves ofJustice, in MIAMI LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 2 (2007).
Rather, "a better starting point for analysis than a world with only minor blem-
ishes may be a world where nothing is enforceable, [and] property and individual
rights are totally insecure ... as in the world that Hobbes so vividly depicted." Id.
Indeed, we can safely say that roughly half of the world's population lives in coun-
tries where "justice is a surprising anomaly." Id. And in such places, it is increas-
ingly commonplace for populist leaders to "lambaste the international system as
inherently biased and dominated by regressive forces" that pander to foreign
businesses, and openly abrogate treaties that restrict the state's power to work
against them. Jan Paulsson, Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribu-
nals, 23 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 215, 222 (2008). The reluctance of a national
judge to hold his own state accountable for an international treaty violation is not
limited to the developing world. See, e.g., Medellfn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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Any true measure ofjustice can be fleeting there as well. When
a similar dispute arose between the United States and the
United Kingdom in the late 1970s, a settlement was reached
only after five months of intensive negotiations, and an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal issued a 369-page opinion from which itself fol-
lowed a decade of failed attempts to resolve the problem
through diplomatic negotiations. 10 7 Indeed, "[slince the pro-
mulgation of the Chicago Convention of 1944, only five disputes
have been submitted to the ICAO Council for formal judicial
resolution," and none of them resulted in "a formal decision on
the merits of the case." 10 8
That is why private air carriers may need to look elsewhere to
recoup their losses from illegitimate and discriminatory prac-
tices and protect their foreign investments going forward. As
discussed above, if any of the world's approximately 2,000 BITs
is in place between the carrier's home state and the offending
state, treaty arbitration provides a good and perhaps the best
alternative. Such arbitration can be invoked by the carrier with-
out the proxy of its home state; it can elevate the dispute beyond
local courts and to a panel of neutral arbitrators; it can decide
the case expediently, with a full panoply of available relief; and
can result in a binding and enforceable award under the New
York Convention.
But can the violation of the Chicago Convention support an
investment claim? In other words, is that Convention fairly in-
cluded as an "obligation [ ] under international law existing...
between the Contracting Parties" that "entitl[es] investments by
investors of the other Contracting Party" to a certain level of
"treatment."10 9 Textually, the answer has to be yes. An "obliga-
tion [ ] ... between" parties typically connotes a bilateral contrac-
tual obligation, which in the context of two sovereigns can only
mean a treaty.110 It follows that, when a BIT contains language
107 Dempsey, supra note 49, at 258-63.
108 Id. at 270. These statistics may illustrate that "the [ICAO] Council consid-
ers that its main task under Article 84 of the Convention is to assist in settling,
rather than in adjudicating, disputes." Thomas Buergenthal, Law-Making in the
International Civil Aviation Organization 136 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1969). In-
deed, the ICAO has been more successful in assisting the consensual resolution
of disputes than have most of the other organs of the UN. See Michael Milde,
Dispute Settlement in the Framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), in SETTLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES 87, 87-88 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel
ed., 1979).
109 China-Ger. BIT, supra note 24, art. 10(1).
o10 Id.; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 322, 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
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of this sort, multilateral and bilateral aviation treaties may pro-
vide the rule of decision for an investor's claims against a recal-
citrant state.
Admittedly, this precise line of reasoning has yet to be pressed
before a BIT tribunal,1 1 and where it has been pressed on the
international stage-before a NAFTA tribunal-consecutive
panels of arbitrators have been reluctant to agree. 1 2 That said,
however, NAFTA does not include the same textual incorpora-
tion of international "obligations" contained in BITs. 1" 3 NAFTA
merely obligates the contracting parties to treat investments "in
accordance with international law," which has been interpreted
by these tribunals to mean only "customary international law,
and not ... standards established by other treaties of the three
NAFTA Parties. '  The express incorporation of "obligations
under international law existing . . . between the Contracting Par-
ties,"' 5 as discussed above, may warrant a different result."16
Even if the reference to "international law" in the provisions
of BITs cannot be construed as "referring to" other interna-
tional laws and treaties; aviation law and jurisprudence may still
serve as relevant context pursuant to Article 31(3) (c) of the Vi-
enna Convention. Though not a rule of decision, such laws may
still "color" the interpretation of substantive BIT provisions. Ar-
ticle 31(3) (c) provides that the treaty interpreter "shall" take
into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable
in the relations between the parties," which means that "[e]very
treaty provision must be read not only in its own context, but in
I Cf CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 615, UN-
CITRAL Arbitration (Sept. 14, 2001) (sustaining BIT claim for violating "the
principle[ ] of international law assuring the alien and his investment treatment
that does not fall below the standards of customary international law").
112 Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award,
159 (Oct. 11, 2002); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, at pt. IVD,
7 7, 15, UNCITRAL Arbitration (August 3, 2005).
113 Mondev Int'l, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 7 111-12.
114 Id.
115 China-Ger. BIT, supra note 24, art. 10(1) (emphasis added).
116 On the other hand, BITs that only contain language similar to NAFTA,
obligating treatment "in accordance with ... international law," or "in no case
less [favorable] than that required by international law," run squarely against the
unfavorable NAFTA precedent in Mondev International, Ltd. and Methanex Corp.
Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment
Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 493, 502-03
(2003). While perhaps persuasive, however, those decisions need not be disposi-
tive. See id. (suggesting that NAFTA precedent should not extend beyond the
"idiosyncrasies" of that treaty).
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the wider context of general international law, whether conven-
tional or customary."117 With about 140 members, the Chicago
Convention is applicable between the parties to many BITs, and
there should be no doubt that it contains "relevant" rules of in-
ternational law. 18
Treatment in line with the norms of international law is ajus-
tified and legitimate expectation, and these expectations are
protected under modern BITs. "Fair and equitable treatment"
(FET), for instance, is guaranteed to foreign investors in nearly
every modern BIT as "an expression and part of the bona fide
principle recognized in international law."119 Because "[a]n in-
vestor's decision to make an investment is based on an assess-
ment of the state of the law and the totality of the business
environment at the time of the investment," the FET standard
obligates contracting states "to treat foreign investors so as to
avoid the frustration of the investors' legitimate and reasonable
expectations. ' 120 In this way, international law norms are incor-
117 I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 139 (2d
ed. 1984) (emphasis added); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 31(3)(c), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
118 The International Court ofJustice has recognized in its advisory opinion on
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia that an adjudicator's "interpretation cannot remain unaffected by subse-
quent developments of law," and that "an international instrument has to be in-
terpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing
at the time of interpretation." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secur-
ity Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 19, 53 (June
21).
119 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 153 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004). In recent
years, a considerable body of case law has given specific meaning and content to
the FET standard, which has emerged as the dominant rule of protection in in-
vestment treaty law. See FOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL AW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 172-73 (2008).
120 Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 301-02, UNCITRAL
Arbitration (Mar. 17, 2006); see also id. 1 285-309 (thoroughly discussing the
FET standard as protecting an investors' "legitimate expectations"). At least
twelve investment tribunals have held that the FET standard is violated when a
state frustrates an investor's legitimate expectations. See, e.g., CME Czech Repub-
lic v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 611, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Sept. 13,
2001); Duke Energy Eltroquil Partners v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19,
Award, 365-66 (Aug. 18, 2008); EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/13, Award, 221 (Oct. 8, 2009); Eureko B.V. (Neth.) v. Republic of
Poland, Ad Hoc, Partial Award, 231-35 (Aug. 19, 2005); Jan de Nul NV v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, 117, 135 (Nov.
6, 2008); Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN
3467 (2004) (award); Pey Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award,
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porated into nearly every BIT, irrespective of whether they ex-
pressly incorporate international law.
Back to our hypothetical example: even if those foreign air-
lines affected by the schedule of illegitimate landing fees could
not, under the relevant BIT, plead a direct violation of an avia-
tion treaty as an investment claim, they may still be able to claim
a denial of FET. The unfairness of the levy, in this context, is
that it runs contrary to the legitimate and reasonable expecta-
tions of those airlines whose investment consists of providing di-
rect flights into that country-specifically, the expectation that
they can land free of any "fees, dues or other charges . . .im-
posed by [the destination] State in respect solely of the right of
... entry into... its territory. '" 121 Indeed, now suppose that the
destination and origin states have signed open skies agreements,
liberalizing their respective markets to each other's carriers and
thereby promising airlines unrestricted route, capacity, and mar-
keting rights.1 2 2 There cannot be much doubt that such an
272 (May 8, 2008); Rumeli Telekomz AS v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
16, Award, 609 (July 29, 2008); Saluka Invs. B.V.v. Czech Republic, Partial
Award, 1 302, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Mar. 17, 2006); Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
Award, 153 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967
(2004).
121 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 15.
122 The U.S. State Department lists the following highlights of virtually all open
skies agreements, which have by default become the template for many new bilat-
eral air services agreements around the world:
1. Free Market Competition[:] No restrictions on international
route rights; number of designated airlines; capacity; frequencies;
or types of aircraft. 2. Pricing Determined by Market Forces[:] A
fare can be disallowed only if both governments concur-"double-
disapproval pricing"-and only for certain, specified reasons in-
tended to ensure competition. 3. Doing Business Protections[:]
For example: All carriers of both countries may establish sales of-
fices in the other country, and convert earnings and remit them in
hard currency promptly and without restrictions. Carriers are free
to provide their own ground-handling services-"self handling"-
or choose among competing providers. Airlines and cargo con-
solidators may arrange ground transport of air cargo and are guar-
anteed access to customs services. User charges are non-
discriminatory and based on costs. 4. Cooperative Marketing Ar-
rangements[:] Airlines may enter into code-sharing or leasing ar-
rangements with airlines of either country, or with those of third
countries. An optional provision authorizes code-sharing between
airlines and surface transportation companies. 5. Provisions for
Consultation and Arbitration[:] Model text includes procedures for
resolving differences that arise under the agreement. 6. Liberal
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agreement creates, at a bare minimum, a legitimate expectation
that the destination state will take necessary steps to make these
rights a reality and certainly not to impede their exercise.
Even NAFTA tribunals have held that breaches of interna-
tional obligations may support, if not directly undergird, a treaty
claim.1 23 According to the tribunal in the S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov-
ernment of Canada arbitration:
[Even though] the breach of a rule of international law by a host
Party may not be decisive in determining that a foreign investor
has been denied "fair and equitable treatment," . . . the fact that a
host Party has breached a rule of international law that is specifi-
cally designed to protect investors will tend to weigh heavily in
favour of finding a breach of [the FET standard]. 124
The concurring arbitrator explored the issue in more detail:
The interpretation and application of [FET] must, I tend to
think,... take into account the letter or spirit of widely, though
not universally, accepted international agreements .... [The]
breach of a treaty rule ... does not appear to be consistent with
the concept that the investor has been given. . . "fair and equita-
ble treatment."1 25
The tribunal in Mondev International, Inc. v. United States noted
that when a state undertakes to provide investors with FET, it
does so "having regard to... the evolutionary character of inter-
national law, . . . whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more
than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of
friendship and commerce.' 126
We can easily move beyond a mere hypothetical; fee disputes
of this type abound in the world of international aviation. The
Charter Arrangements[:] Carriers may choose to operate under the
charter regulations of either country. 7. Safety and Security[:]
Each government agrees to observe high standards of aviation
safety and security, and to render assistance to the other in certain
circumstances. 8. Optional 7th Freedom All-Cargo Rights: Pro-
vides authority for an airline of one country to operate all-cargo
services between the other country and a third country, via flights
that are not linked to its homeland.
Open Skies Agreement Highlights, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Jan. 30, 2009), http:/
/www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2009 /119760.htm.
123 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Canada (U.S. v. Can.), NAFFA/UNCITRAL Tri-
bunal, 7 264 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://italaw.com/documents/
SDMeyers-1 stPartialAward.pdf.
124 Id.
125 Id. 7 234-38 (Schwartz, J., concurring).
126 Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award,
119, 125 (Oct. 11, 2002), 125 I.L.R. 110 (2004) (emphasis added).
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U.S.-U.K dispute briefly noted above involved the British Air-
ports Authority's imposition of a new landing fee schedule that
incorporated a steep increase in peak-period charges and a
weight element, which fell primarily upon the wide-bodied air-
craft used by transatlantic carriers rather than domestic or intra-
Europe flights. 127 These charges violated Article 15 of the Chi-
cago Convention, as well as Article 10(3) of the U.S.-U.K. Avia-
tion BIT, which provides that such "charges may reflect, but shall
not exceed, the full cost to the competent charging authorities of
providing appropriate airport and air navigation facilities and
services. ' 12
8
A more recent dispute between U.S. carriers and Argentina is
clearer still:
In early 2002 the government of Argentina delinked its peso
from the U.S. dollar, whereupon the value of the peso quickly
fell to about 33 U.S. cents. In an attempt to mitigate the ensuing
panic, the Argentine Congress passed a law requiring that public
service tariffs, including airport user fees, which were formerly
denominated in dollars, be paid in pesos as though each peso
were still worth $1.00, that is, at a one-to-one rate. The Argentine
Executive, however, issued a Decree requiring that airport user
charges for international flights-for landing, parking, and air traf-
fic control-at Buenos Aires International Airport... be paid in
dollars at the floating exchange rate of roughly three-to-one. 129
The result was that the airport charges for foreign carriers were
approximately three times higher than those paid by Argen-
tina's domestic carrier, Aerolineas. 130 These sorts of charges,
127 Dempsey, supra note 49, at 258-59.
128 Id. at 259-60 (emphasis added).
129 Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 415 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
130 See id. Nearly a decade later, this dispute remains, to some degree, un-
resolved. In June 2003, DOT found that "'the imposition of higher fees at Ezeiza
airport on U.S. carriers than those paid by Aerolineas Argentina constitutes, on
its face, the type of activity that [the FCPA] was intended to reach"' and that this
situation constitutes a violation of the Air Transport Agreement between the
United States and the Republic of Argentina. Id. at 3-4. After months of unsuc-
cessful talks between the two countries, the DOT imposed countermeasures on
Aerolineas, and conditioned their foreign carrier permit on periodic payments
into a U.S. escrow account to offset the difference between what it actually pays
for services at Ezeiza airport and the higher amount it would be paying were it
not benefiting from discriminatorily favorable treatment vis-a-vis U.S. carriers. Id.
These countermeasures against Aerolineas remain in place, and have resulted in
Aeorlineas Argentina having deposited over $6 million into the escrow account
since 2003.
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the amount of which has no connection to the cost of services
provided, arguably violate Article 15 of the Chicago Convention
and a host of bilateral commitments in the U.S.-Argentina avia-
tion treaty. 131 The U.S.-Argentina BIT guarantees U.S. investors
"fair and equitable treatment... required by international law,"
so being subject to these illegitimate charges likely falls below
that minimum standard.
13 2
Now let's adapt our hypothetical to illustrate the full scope of
BIT protections: suppose the charges on incoming aircraft were
based not on the nationality of the airline, but on the distance
or route travelled to its destination. 133 Because the charge is still
untethered to the cost of services provided by the destination
state, it plausibly remains in violation of the Chicago Conven-
tion and its progeny of bilateral aviation agreements.3 But it
also violates something more fundamental. The charge is, in
essence, an attempt to regulate conduct occurring over the high
seas and in the territory of third-party states. It is a basic rule of
customary international law that each state has sovereignty over
its "land area, internal waters and territorial sea"-no more, and
131 See id. at 3.
132 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, art. II(2) (a).
133 There is, again, real-world precedent for such a scheme. An initial iteration
of the U.K's increased landing fees were based on the distance flown,
thereby [(once again)] falling most heavily upon transatlantic carri-
ers. Because the fees were not related to the costs of providing
such services, the United States in 1975 found under its Fair Com-
petitive Practices Act (FCPA) that they were excessive and discrimi-
natory. As a consequence, the distance-based formula was
eliminated for most British airports immediately, although they
were retained at Scottish airports until late 1979.
Dempsey, supra note 62, at 258.
134 ICAO's decision rejecting the United States' attempt to impose extraterrito-
rial security provisions on foreign carriers is instructive on this point. In 1999,
the United States issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would
have required foreign air carriers to adhere to security measures that were "iden-
tical" to U.S. security measures when departing other states bound for the United
States. See ICAO Secretary General, Ramifications of the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing (NPRM) Related to Security Provisions to be Applied to Foreign Air Carriers by the
United States 1.5 (ICAO Council, Working Paper No. 11030, 1999). The ICAO
Secretary General concluded that the proposed rule would "fall outside the
framework of the Chicago system." Id. at 3.8, 4.1. Upon review, the ICAO
Council agreed, deciding that the proposed NPRM infringed on the right of each
State to "legislate and to enforce their legislation within their sovereign territo-
ries." Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Summary of Decisions, at 2, ICAO Doc. No. C-DEC
156/1 (Feb. 8, 1999).
48520111
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
no less. 135 This precise delineation of a state's territorial juris-
diction applies to the airspace above land and waters, too. 136 It
is thus a rule of customary international law that all aircraft are
subject to that state's regulatory jurisdiction while they are
within a state's sovereign sphere.' But, it is equally clear as a
matter of custom that a state cannot regulate conduct of a non-
national aircraft before it reaches the state's airspace."3 ' A viola-
tion of this principle can equally color an investor's legitimate
expectations and his claim to vindicate the FET he is due. In
many ways, claims of this nature lie at the apex of aviation law,
whose raison d'etre is to "avoid friction" in the overlap of sover-
eignties that occurs as "international civil aviation [is] developed
in a safe and orderly manner."'39 Real world examples of this
type of dispute, where a state reaches to extend its regulatory
reach over international aviation, are becoming more common-
place, 4 ° and may well be another situation where international
airlines can assert their treaty-based rights when such regula-
tions harm their foreign investments.
However they are designed, these sorts of regulations do more
than merely hinder air transport operations. When the regula-
tion is accomplished by levying fees, duties, or taxes, these regu-
lations require illicit payments to be made by the foreign
135 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Fin., art. 1(4), Nov. 15, 2004, available at http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aar-
ticle/h/au/201001/20100106725240.html; see also Chicago Convention, supra
note 52, art. 2.
136 Chicago Convention, supra note 52, art. 1.
137 Id. arts. 11-13.
138 See id. art. 11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403 (1987);
Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 272 (2009).
139 Chicago Convention, supra note 52.
140 A diplomatic and legal row occurred in the mid-1990s when the U.S. for-
bade gambling and smoking on international flights. Foreign carriers under-
standably claimed the law sought improperly to extend the jurisdiction of the
United States to conduct aboard foreign aircraft operating outside the United
States' airspace-which they deemed a trespass on their respective sovereignties.
See Brian C. O'Donnell, Gambling to Be Competitive: The Gorton.Amendment and Inter-
national Law, 16 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 254, 257-60 (1997). More recently, the
European Union has sought to incorporate international aviation into its emis-
sions trading regime, and in effect impose heavy fees on international flights
based on fuel used over their states and the high seas. Foreign carriers, through
their respective trade associations, have challenged that extraterritorial extension
of EU regulation in the U.K. High Court. The matter was referred to, and re-
mains pending before, the court of Justice for the European Communities. See
Preliminary Reference C-366/10, 2010 O.J. (C 260), 1, 9-10.
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investor to the regulating state. 41 What results is an "unjust en-
richment," the avoidance of which is "recognized as a general
principle of international law."14 2 A leading treatise concluded
that "the inherent equitable character that lies behind the prin-
ciple of unjust enrichment fits perfectly the objective and mean-
ing of the FET."'143 Like the "unfairness" of a levy, the
"unjustness" of the enrichment can be defined by the violation
of a multilateral or bilateral aviation agreement or customary
international law more generally.
C. USING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TO VINDICATE THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO NATIONAL AND NON-
DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
Our hypothetical example of the landing fee being imposed
on foreign carriers not only offends international aviation law
and the legitimate expectation of international airlines-it is
also patently discriminatory. Fortunately for airlines, nearly
every BIT will oblige host states to afford "national treatment" to
foreign investors,144 meaning that foreign investors be treated
no differently from comparable investors that are nationals of
the host state.1 45 According to a 1999 report by the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
"[t]he national treatment standard is perhaps the single most
important standard of treatment enshrined in international in-
141 See id.
142 Indeed, at least one arbitral tribunal has acknowledged that an investor
might be protected by the fair and equitable treatment standard against unjust
enrichment by the host state. Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
448-56, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Mar. 17, 2006) (denying relief on this claim
because the claimant could not satisfy the necessary elements to plead unjust
enrichment).
143 TUDOR, supra note 119, at 173.
144 See, e.g., China-U.K BIT, supra note 24, art. 3 (obliging the state to "accord
treatment in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the
investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party the same as
that accorded to its own nationals or companies"); Treaty Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. II(1),
Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-15 (entered into force May 11, 1997)
[hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT] ("Each Party shall permit and treat investment,
and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded
in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or com-
panies, or of nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the most
favorable.").
145 U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 144.
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vestment agreements.' ' 46 Some BITs have even more explicit
anti-discrimination provisions, and prohibit the host state from
taking any "unreasonable or discriminatory measures against
the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of
investments in its territory. 147 No matter how they are phrased,
these provisions prohibit measures that are both "discriminatory
in effect as well as those which are intentionally discrimina-
tory.' 48 Tribunals tend to focus on the discriminatory effect of
the conduct, holding "that the impact of the measure on the
investment [is] the determining factor to ascertain whether it
had resulted in non-discriminatory treatment.' ' 49
Take, for example, a Mexican law adopted in 2001 that im-
posed a 20% tax on any drink that used sweetener not made
from cane sugar. 5 ° On its face, the new tax applied to compa-
nies across the board, irrespective of nationality. 15 And, while it
was directly applied to soft drink bottlers, its most significant ef-
fect was felt by high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) manufacturers
as the soft drink bottlers switched from using HFCS to sugar
cane sweeteners. 52 CPI, an American company, immediately
brought an investment treaty claim against Mexico under Chap-
ter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
alleging a breach of "national treatment. ' 153 As it was, CPI was
the dominant supplier of HFCS to the Mexican soft drink indus-
try, and the imposition of the tax nearly destroyed its market. 154
In fact, the "production of HFCS in Mexico was wholly concen-
146 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, N.Y., N.Y. & Geneva,
Switz., 1999, National Treatment, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/ll (Vol. IV),
available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitdl lv4.en.pdf.
147 China-U.K. BIT, supra note 24, art. 2(2); see also U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra
note 144, art. 11(3)(b) ("Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or
discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoy-
ment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments.").
148 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 77 (1992).
149 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
321 (Feb. 6, 2007); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 177 (2008).
150 Ley del Impuesto Sobre Producci6n y Servicios [Law on the Special Tax on
Production and Services], art. 2(I) (G), Diario Oficial de La Federaci6n [DO], 12
de enero 2002 (Mex).
151 See id.
152 See Corn Prods. Int'l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, 44 (2008).
153 Id. 1 52; see North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
154 See Corn Prods. Int'l, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, 27, 83.
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trated in foreign-owned enterprises (predominantly CPI . . .),
whereas production of sugar was largely carried out by Mexican
nationals. ' 155 Because "HFCS is directly substitutable for sugar
as a soft drink sweetener," '156 it follows that "the effect of what
was, in substance, a special tax on HFCS was the distortion of
the market in favour of domestic suppliers and to the disadvan-
tage of the foreign investors protected by Chapter XI of the
NAFTA.' 57 As a result, the tribunal held that "the HFCS tax was
a violation of CPI's right[ ]" to be accorded "national treatment"
in Mexico. 5
Let's assume, then, that our hypothetical aviation state has
older, smaller aircraft comprising its national fleet. Foreign car-
riers who have begun to operate much newer and, thus, much
larger aircraft serve its airports. These foreign carriers pur-
chased these planes with an eye toward servicing the long-haul
travel needs of the state's growing population as well as their
own citizens. The state, however, refuses to grant permission for
them to enter its airspace or, more commonly, limits landing
slots at reasonable times of the day. Its officials cite non-existent
"infrastructure" concerns, but the real reason for these restric-
tions is to protect the national airline. 159 Like the Mexican levy
155 Id. 132.
156 Id. 124.
157 Id. 1 132. The tribunal noted that the case might have been different "if
HFCS had been produced in equal (or nearly equal) volume by Mexican-owned
and U.S.-owned firms. In that circumstance, a measure designed adversely to
affect the market for HFCS... could not have been held to violate the require-
ment of national treatment." Id.; see also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 146 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21
ICSID Rev.-FILJ 155 (2006) (sectorial discrimination does not run afoul of na-
tional treatment unless the measure specifically targets foreign investors).
158 Corn Prods. Int'l, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, 143. But see
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award at pt. IVD, 7, 15, UNICITRAL
Arbitration (Aug. 5, 2005) (upholding an industry-wide ban on certain chemical
products was nondiscriminatory, even though most of those chemicals were for-
eign-made, because there was a reasonable showing that it was undertaken "for a
public purpose," as the result of relevant studies, and enacted "with due process"
and in good faith).
159 These fact patterns, too, are not purely hypothetical. SeeJay Menon, India
Still Not Ready to Accommodate A380, AVIATION WK. (May 17, 2011), http://www.
aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/
avd/2011/05/17/10.xml (discussing India's refusal to allow Lufthansa's A380
aircraft into its airports; but while India cites the infrastructure concerns, com-
mentators believe that the government's approach is more likely focused on cur-
tailing competition for domestic carriers, who do not have the new A380s);
Taffaha Defends Arab Carriers to US Aviation Club and Predicts Further Growth, ARA-
BIAN AEROSPACE ONLINE NEWS SERVICE (April 28, 2011), http://www.arabianaer-
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on HFCS, it is difficult to view this regulation as anything more
than discriminatory protectionism in violation of its bilateral in-
vestment obligations.16 °
Real cases like this abound in the world of aviation. When the
U.K. imposed high fees on heavy airplanes, it naturally and un-
avoidably discriminated against U.S. transatlantic carriers in
favor of domestic carriers."' Some of these cases are patently
discriminatory without even a guise of legitimate non-protec-
tionism; the charges on U.S. carriers in Argentina, for example,
were discriminatory on their very face.162 Even more recently, in
2004, Italy denied U.S. carriers the right to market service at
Milan's Linate airport through code-sharing arrangements with
their European airline partners, but permitted its own national
carrier, Alitalia, to serve the same market through code-sharing
ospace.aero/article.php?section=Air-transport&article=taffaha-defends-arab-
carriers-to-us-aviation-club-and-predicts-further-growth (quoting head of major
Arab airline trade group as stating that lack of slots at major airports in Europe,
"'more often than not, nultifyies [sic] the liberalization of traffic rights"').
160 This typical fact pattern illustrates why most BITs juxtapose the obligation
of states to refrain from both "arbitrary" and "discriminatory" treatment. See, e.g.,
U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 144, art. 11(3) (b). Black's Law Dictionary defines
"arbitrary" as "[i]n an unreasonable manner," "[w]ithout adequate determining
principle," "[w]ithout fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without cause
based upon the law," "not governed by any fixed rules or standard," "[w] illful and
unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts and circum-
stances presented," and "synonymous with bad faith or failure to exercise honest
judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1990). BIT tribunals have fol-
lowed this lead. The Lauder v. Czech Republic tribunal specifically referred to this
definition in defining "arbitrary" to mean "depending on individual discretion; . . .
founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact." Lauder v. Czech Re-
public, Final Award, 221, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Sept. 3, 2001). In our hypo-
thetical, if the claimant can show that the developing state's airports have
sufficient capabilities to handle the jumbo aircraft, it follows that the decision to
ban them is notjust a discrimination tactic, but also an "arbitrary" decision likely
based upon "prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact." While these
provisions coalesce in this hypothetical case, scholars have noted that "the sepa-
rate listing of the two standards, typically separated by the word 'or,' suggests that
each must be accorded its own significance and scope." DOLZER & SCHREUER,
supra note 149, at 173. So there remains the possibility that a national measure
may be arbitrary, but not necessarily discriminatory, and vice versa.
161 This is because the parking and landing cost for a British Airways Trident
was only about one-ninth that of a Boeing 747, and the landing cost for a British
Airways Concorde was a mere fraction of the B-747 cost. See A Review of U.S.
International Aviation Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 97th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.
(1982) (statement of C.E. Meyer, Jr.).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
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with Delta and Air France.163 United and American were, thus,
placed at a substantial disadvantage in competing for U.S.-Italy
traffic. 164 Like the other disputes before it, this one, too, was
ultimately settled through state-to-state negotiations. 165 Ameri-
can and United requested the DOT to apply countermeasures
to eliminate this advantage by (1) barring all flights to the
United States that originate at Milan's Linate airport; and (2)
barring Alitalia from code-sharing with any other carrier to dis-
play service to or from Linate in conjunction with services of-
fered by that other carrier to or from the United States.1 66 The
complaint prompted consultations between the U.S. and Italian
governments, 67 which eventually led Alitalia to cease its third-
country code-sharing service to the United States.
168
State-centric resolution was the only avenue of relief for the
U.S. carriers in these instances. There is no U.S.-U.K. BIT, no
U.S.-Italy BIT; and the U.S.-Argentina BIT, like most U.S. BITs,
permits the states to make certain exceptions to the guarantee
of "national treatment" in the field of air transport. 169 But, the
U.I, Italy, and Argentina combine for a total of 219 BITs in
force with countries other than the United States;170 countries
whose terms guarantee national treatment for aviation investors,
whose home states have far less diplomatic clout and economic
leverage than the U.S. government, but whose airlines are detri-
mentally affected by the same discriminatory treatment. 17 1 In-
vestment treaty arbitration is another potentially powerful
avenue for these carriers to assert their rights.
163 Am. Airlines v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.P.A., OST-2004-19790, 2004
WL 2747636 (D.O.T. Nov. 30, 2004) [hereinafter American Order Instituting
Proceedings].
164 Id.
165 See Am. Airlines, Joint Pet. for Recons. of Order 2005-7-22 (Aug. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.airlineinfo.com/Sites/DailyAirline/web-content/
ostdocket2004/ost0419790.html [hereinafter American Joint Petition].
166 American Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 163.
167 American Joint Petition, supra note 165.
168 Id.; Joint Reply of American Airlines and United Airlines, AiRLINE INFO. SEARCH
(Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostdocket2004/ost0419 7 90.html.
169 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 42, Protocol.
170 See Investment Instruments Online Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
DocSearch 779.aspx (last updated Mar. 15, 2011) (allowing user to search for
BITs by country).
171 See, e.g., China-U.K. BIT, supra note 24, art. 2 (providing for comprehensive
national treatment without enumerating exceptions).
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D. "UMBRELLA CLAUSES" IN INVESTMENT TREATIES: THE
ELEVATION OF ORDINARY CONTRACT DISPUTES INTO
TREATY DISPUTES
The plain language of many BITs requires an investment host
state to "observe any obligation it may have entered into with
regard to investments.""17 This provision has very broad reper-
cussions. By their express terms, these so-called "umbrella
clauses" do not specify to whom the obligation is owed, and they
do not limit the host state's obligations to parties with direct
privity of contract. 173 The history and modern application of
such clauses illustrates that their very purpose is to ensure that a
state's violation of a contract that impairs foreign investment
constitutes an international wrong and, thus, an actionable
wrong under the treaty.174
In 1959, the drafters of the Ab-Shawcross Draft Convention
on Investments Abroad included an umbrella clause stipulating
that "[e] ach Party shall at all times ensure the observance of any
undertakings, which it may have given in relation to investments
made by nationals of any other Party. '175 This provision's pur-
pose was to ensure that a state's unilateral violation of a contract
that relates to foreign investment would be deemed to consti-
tute an international wrong.
The purpose of the clause is to dispel whatever doubts may possi-
bly exist as to whether a unilateral violation of a concession con-
tract is an international wrong .... [It thus] served two purposes:
it involved an undertaking that the state would not interfere with
contractual arrangements made with foreign investors and cru-
cially, when coupled with compulsory dispute settlement provi-
172 See, e.g., U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 144, art. II(3)(c).
173 See id.
174 See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES 81-82 (1995); John P. Gaffney & James L. Loftis, The "Effective Ordinary Mean-
ing" of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based Tribunals to Hear Contract Claims, 8J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 5, 17-23 (2007); Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims-The SGS Cases Considered, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler
ed., 2005); F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 245-46 (1982); Hein-Jargen Schramke, The Interpreta-
tion of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 1,
22 (2007).
175 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (ABS-Shawcross Draft Convention),
UNCTAD, art. II, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compen-
dium//en/137%20volume%205.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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sions, it would create a remedy for breach of that obligation in
international law where one did not exist in municipal law.' 7 6
In the same year as the Ab-Shawcross Draft, the umbrella clause
appeared in the first-known BIT between Germany and Paki-
stan. 177 It stated that "[e]ither Party shall observe any other obli-
gation it may have entered into with regard to investments by
nationals or companies of the other Party. ' 17 Commentators
describe the role of the umbrella clause as that of "trans-
form[ing] responsibility incurred towards a private investor
under a contract into international responsibility. 179
In 1967, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) recommended to its member states a draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (OECD Draft
Convention) as both a model for their bilateral investment trea-
ties and as a general statement of international law rules applica-
ble to foreign investment.8 ° Article 2, the "Observance and
Undertakings" clause, stipulated that "[e]ach Party shall at all
times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in rela-
tion to property of nationals of any other Party.' 18' Eliu Lauter-
pacht explained that the umbrella clause's effect was to "put
[investor-state contracts] on a special plane in that breach of
176 Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law
of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT'L 411, 423-24 (2004).
177 See Emily Sweeney Samuelson & Solomon Ebere, Could a Foreign Investor Use
GATS Disciplines in a BIT Claim? 12 (Working Paper on GATS Negotiations on
Domestic Regulation, Discussion Draft of March 12, 2010, 2010), available at
http://www.boell.org/web/161-558.html.
178 Id.
179 Sinclair, supra note 176, at 433.
180 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, at pmbl., Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117.
181 Id. art. 2; see also Sinclair, supra note 176, at 427. More recently, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development concluded that the existence of
an umbrella clause in a BIT means that "violations of commitments regarding
investment by the host country would be redressible through the dispute settle-
ment procedures of a BIT." UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOP-
MENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, supra note 16, at 56.
The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations likewise concluded
that an umbrella clause
makes the respect of such contracts [between the host State and
the investor] . . . an obligation under the treaty. Thus, the breach
of such a contract by the host State would engage its responsibility
under the agreement and-unless direct dispute settlement proce-
dures come into play-entitle the home State to exercise diplo-
matic protection of the investor.
U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, at 39,
U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.1 (1988).
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them becomes immediately a breach of convention. '"182 The
early model BITs of both France and the United States were also
"cast in nearly identical terms to the OECD['s] Draft" and in-
tended to "raise[ ] to a treaty issue any attempt by a BIT partner
to invalidate a contract by changes in domestic law or otherwise
S.. a breach of contract constitutes a breach of treaty. 183
Numerous arbitral tribunals have since ruled that umbrella
clauses in BITs provide foreign investors with an international
forum to resolve their commercial contract disputes with host
governments. In Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, the tribunal
held that Article 11(2) (c) of the US-Romania BIT had the effect
of "transform[ing] contractual undertakings into international
law obligations and accordingly makes it a breach of the BIT. '1 84
After analyzing the plain language and purpose of the umbrella
clause, as well as arbitral precedent, the tribunal concluded that
such clauses may impose
international responsibility [upon a signatory state] by reason of
a breach of its contractual obligations towards the private inves-
tor of the other Party, the breach of contract being thus "interna-
tionalized", i.e. assimilated to a breach of the treaty. In such a
case, an international tribunal will be bound to seek to give use-
ful effect to the provision that the parties have adopted. 85
So long as the contract in question was part of an "investment,"
alleged breaches of it can be brought by an international airline
against a foreign sovereign not in the sovereign's own courts,
182 See Eli Laughterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investment, in
THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
18, 31 (1962); Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed
Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 147 (2006)
(alteration in original).
183 Sinclair, supra note 176, at 433. Kenneth Vandevelde, former lead attorney
within the U.S. State Department on investment matters, who participated in the
preparation of the U.S. Model BIT and in the negotiation of several U.S. BITs,
explained that, pursuant to an umbrella clause:
a party's breach of an investment agreement with an investor be-
comes a breach of the BIT, for which the investor or its state may
seek a remedy under the investor-to-state or state-to-state disputes
procedures. In effect, this clause authorizes use of the BITs' dis-
putes procedures to enforce investment agreements between the
investor and the host state.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 148, at 78.
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but in an international arbitral forum. Thus, a state's decision
to include umbrella clauses in investment treaties is precisely "to
elevate [it]'s contractual breaches to the level of treaty
violations. 186
The experience of Zeevi Holdings in Bulgaria is a paradig-
matic case of the type of aviation/investment contract being set-
tled by international arbitral bodies.18 7 Zeevi was an Israeli
investor that, in 1999, purchased a 75% share of Balkan, Bulga-
ria's national airline, from the government of Bulgaria. a88 The
company presented as having a valuable asset: status as the Bul-
garian exclusive national carrier, which grants various rights and
privileges upon the airline. 8 ° Soon after consummation of the
privatization agreement (PA), which assured Balkan's continued
National Carrier Status (NCS) and represented certain assets
and debts in an independent audit report, the government of
Bulgaria divested Balkan of its NCS.'90 This led to Balkan's
bankruptcy, and Zeevi brought an UNCITRAL arbitration
against the government of Bulgaria.' 9' The tribunal eventually
found that the revocation of NCS, inter alia, breached the PA.' 92
In the tribunal's words, the NCS "is of vital importance for an
airline since it assures the airlines rights and overflight rights via
international treaties ... [without which] it cannot collect royal-
ties."' 93 Because NCS was "expressly assured by the Respon-
dent" in the PA, it alone assumed the risk of revocation by third
186 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty-The Juris-
diction of Treaty-Based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS
v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 J. WORLD INV'T & TRADE 555, 567 (2004)
(citing the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVEST-
MENT TREATIES IN THE MIn-1990S, supra note 16 (noting that while umbrella
clauses contained in BITs are "directed in particular at investment agreements
that host countries frequently conclude with individual foreign investors ... the
language of the provision is so broad that it could be interpreted to cover all
kinds of obligations, explicit or implied, contractual or non-contractual, under-
taken with respect to investment generally")).
187 See Zeevi Holdings v. Republic of Bulg., Final Award, UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion (Oct. 25, 2006).
188 Id. 2.5.
189 See id. 9.
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states and is thereby liable to the investor for over USD 10 mil-
lion in damages.194
The obligation expressed in umbrella clauses goes beyond bi-
lateral contracts, too. In Enron v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal
noted that the umbrella clause is meant to cover "both contrac-
tual obligations such as payment as well as obligations assumed
through law or regulation.1 195 The Continental Casualty Co. v. Argen-
tine Republic tribunal also ruled that the umbrella clause of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT guarantees a state's adherence to "unilateral
commitments arising from provisions of the law of the host State
regulating a particular business sector and addressed specifically
to the foreign investors in relation to their investments
therein." '96 As the Eureko B. V. v. Republic of Poland tribunal con-
cluded, the umbrella clause "means what it says," and its plain
language does not differentiate between undertakings of a com-
mercial as opposed to a sovereign nature.1 97 "Any obligation"
means just that-it does not mean "any sovereign obligation" or
"any sovereign, non-commercial obligation," which are limiting
phrases that could have been included in the clause had the
parties so intended. 198
This provision brings us full circle. As discussed above, the
web of aviation bilaterals contains a host of sovereign obligations
that inure directly to airlines. Those are plainly "sovereign obli-
gations" directed at the aviation sector, so by virtue of these
"umbrella clauses" prevalent in most modern BITs, states must
solemnly abide by those obligations. While these clauses may
only provide a belt to the existing suspenders that uphold com-
pliance with international aviation laws, it provides the perfect
foil to understand the focus-and the power-of bilateral in-
vestment treaties for international airlines: states can no longer
arbitrarily violate the global web of international aviation law,
194 Id. 1 276, 994. Jurisdiction for this claim was founded upon an arbitration
clause in the PA, but if that clause did not exist, the same claim could likely have
been brought under the umbrella clause in Article 11 of the Israel-Bulgaria BIT.
195 Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/3, Award, 320 (May 22, 2007) (emphasis added).
196 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award,
301 (Sept. 5, 2008).
197 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., (Aug. 19, 2005) (Partial Award and Dissent-
ing Opinion), reprinted in 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007).
198 See El Paso Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 7 75, 77 (Apr. 27, 2006); Pan Am. Energy v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections,
106 (July 27, 2006).
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for instance, to protect its national carriers or derive an unjust
windfall of regulatory fees. When they do, and they harm a for-
eign airline's investment, they can be held accountable by for-
eign investors for their actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional state-centric mechanisms to resolve aviation
disputes are not entirely ineffective or outmoded. They serve
their intended purpose to provide states a forum for specialized
dialogue; frequently, bilateral negotiations resolve market access
and doing-business problems. The mechanism available to
states under the Chicago Convention, however, hardly whets the
appetite; for the development of aviation law and the vindica-
tion of private rights under that law, five disputes in 65 years is a
starvation diet. 9 The ability of a private airline to force inter-
national aviation law directly upon a recalcitrant state, and by-
pass the state-to-state mechanisms presented by aviation treaties,
may provide a powerful tool to force compliance with the global
web of supranational regulation provided by those laws. In a
highly-regulated industry like aviation, with internationally gen-
erated legal norms, the developing mechanism of BIT arbitra-
tion can exert a strong disciplinary influence over the exercise
of a state's regulatory authority and gives industry participants a
powerful form of judicial protection and judicial review.
199 Noteworthy colillileltators have said the same thing about the ICJ's juris-
diction to hear commercial disputes brought by sovereigns on behalf of their
investors, which has led to a paltry two decisions in fifty years and-concomi-
tantly-the evolution of investor-state arbitration to fill the void. See Jan Paul-
sson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration
and International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. (2006).
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